M e d ic a id is t h e d o m i n a n t t h i r d -p a r t y p a y e r
This study examines the following questions: First, to what extent does entry into nursing homes result in impoverishment before the dis abled elderly become Medicaid eligible ("spenddown")? Second, how do states' eligibility rules affect spenddown? Third, are there substantial in centives for the disabled elderly to shield assets to facilitate becoming Medicaid eligible? Fourth, what out-of-pocket prices can the disabled el derly expect to pay for nursing-home care? Fifth, does the housing wealth that the disabled elderly or their heirs now retain constitute a ma jor untapped Medicaid revenue source?
To date, many studies of Medicaid spenddown that address the first question have relied solely on information about nursing-home residents (Burwell, Adams, and Meiners 1989; Spence and Wiener 1990) . Other research on this issue has focused on the dynamics of actual Medicaid en rollment in the noninstitutionalized population (Branch et al. 1988; Short et al. 1992) . One study used the 1984 National Long Term Care Survey (NLTCS) to estimate conversions to Medicaid among community residents and compared rates of conversion between persons entering nursing homes and those remaining in the community (Liu, Doty, and Manton 1990) .
These types of studies can answer the first question that our study ad dresses, but not the others. A more definitive answer to the question of the impoverishment of the disabled elderly requires a comparison of states' standards for Medicaid eligibility with the disabled elderly's in come and wealth and marital status. To address the combination of is sues embodied in the first four questions, we conducted policy simulations.
The simulations performed three functions: First, this method pro vided estimates of the number of disabled elderly in the community who would be financially eligible for Medicaid if they were to enter a nursing home and remain there until death. The effect of states' major decisions about eligibility policy on this eventuality was also considered. We iden tified persons eligible for Medicaid if they entered a nursing home by applying eligibility rules to persons living in the community. We used data from nursing-home residents to provide consistency checks on re sults from our policy simulations. Second, no survey provides informa tion on amounts of public subsidies and the price of the nursing-home net of such subsidies. By combining data on income, assets, and marital status from the NLTCS with information on prices and state policies the Elderly from various sources, the simulations provided values of subsidies and net prices of nursing-home care. Third, we assessed effects of a major re cent policy change that was designed to address the impoverishment issue-the spousal impoverishment provision of the Medicare Cata strophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA) -on Medicaid eligibility and on the prices families could expect to pay for nursing-home care.
A related theme is the impoverishment of the Medicaid program itself as a consequence of the high expense of nursing-home care. Potentially, a source of funds could be found in the assets of the elderly who are in stitutionalized at Medicaid's expense. With data on housing wealth of the disabled elderly from the NLTCS, we gauged the potential of such assets as a revenue source for Medicaid.
Evolution of Medicaid Policy regarding Assets of the Elderly in Nursing Homes
Each state designs and manages its own Medicaid program within broad federal guidelines. States' considerable discretion in establishing eligibil ity criteria provides a source of variation in the price of nursing-home services faced by patients net of Medicaid's subsidy (Buchanan, Madel, and Persons 1991; Carpenter 1988; Neuschler 1987 ; U.S. General Ac counting Office 1990). Unlike most services, for which Medicaid imposes at most minimal patient cost sharing, Medicaid requires that recipients contribute all but a small amount of their income to the cost of nursinghome care.
Until recently, the answer, at first glance, to the question of whether the disabled elderly must impoverish themselves before becoming eligi ble for Medicaid may have seemed obvious. States were almost uniform in the wealth standards set to determine an elderly person's eligibility for Medicaid. Persons had to have virtually no nonhousing assets to qualify, although treatment of housing wealth was more liberal. However, the "spousal impoverishment'' provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Cov erage Act of 1988 (MCCA), a feature of the act that remains in force, changed the eligibility picture somewhat, at least for married persons en tering nursing homes. The spousal impoverishment provision required states to permit spouses at home to retain a much larger amount of non housing assets (between $13,296 and $64,480 per month at each state's discretion in 1991) and established higher national standards for the amount of income that the outside spouse could have available for his or her use, ranging from $856 to $1,662 in 1991 (National Governors' As sociation 1991). The majority of persons entering nursing homes are un married, and thus unaffected by the spousal impoverishment provision (Kemper and Murtaugh 1991) . For such persons the resource standard was around $2,000 in 1991-92 (Sloan and Shayne 1992) .
A complicating factor is that income and wealth may be shielded by the individual to facilitate becoming Medicaid eligible. One way to avoid using one's own assets for nursing-home care ("spenddown") is to transfer wealth to relatives. Although, to date, transfers for this purpose are thought to occur infrequently, anecdotal evidence suggests that the practice is increasing (Kosterlitz 1991) . Recent publications that provide financial advice to the elderly and newspaper reports suggest that, with asset transfers, Medicaid trusts, or annuities, a large number of elderly could become Medicaid eligible without impoverishment (Bove 1982; Budish 1989; Quinn 1989; Asinof 1991; Schultz 1992) .
In order to limit individuals' attempts to circumvent Medicaid's re source limits by transferring assets, Congress enacted two statutory changes in the early 1980s. The Boren-Long Amendment of 1980 per mitted states to restrict transfers of Medicaid-excluded assets from assets counted in determining financial eligibility. Home equity, which repre sents most elderly persons' largest asset, remained exempt from restric tions on transfers. In the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Congress enacted a more comprehensive approach by au thorizing state Medicaid programs to place further restrictions on asset transfers, impose liens on real property owned by living Medicaid recipi ents, and recover the costs of services from the estates of deceased recipi ents (U.S. General Accounting Office 1989). Recent reports suggest that few states have implemented the TEFRA provisions that permit them to tap these resources (Kusserow 1988; U.S. General Accounting Office 1989) .
The original transfer-of-assets provisions of TEFRA permitted states to deny Medicaid coverage to individuals who otherwise became eligible because they disposed of assets for less than fair market value within 24 months of applying for Medicaid or at any time after this period. MCCA subsequently extended the time period ("lookback period") to 30 months and made the period uniform among states.
Methods Data
Data on elderly individuals came from the National Long Term Care Surveys (NLTCS) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1982 Bureau in , 1984 Bureau in , and 1989 . For most purposes we limited our analysis to 1989. During May-June 1989, NLTCS surveyed 6,120 persons, of whom 1,520 resided in institutions, mainly nursing homes. The sample was derived by screening persons from the Medicare Health Insurance Skeleton Eligibil ity Write-off file. Criteria for inclusion in the NLTCS were that respon dents be at least age 65 and "disabled," that is, needing help in one or more Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) for at least three months prior to the survey. About 15 percent of the Medicare-eligible population had conditions that qual ified them for inclusion in the NLTCS. Although NLTCS is unrepresen tative of all elderly, having ADLs and I ADLs appreciably increases the probable use either of nursing-home care or of help at home (Headen 1993; Kemper 1992) . Thus, from the standpoint of long-term-care ser vices, this is a relatively vulnerable population. At the time of the sur vey, respondents were subject to pre-MCCA Medicaid eligibility mles, although some may have been influenced by awareness of the new mles that were to become effective later in the year.
Compared with the general population of persons over age 65, data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) showed that NLTCS respon dents were older and more likely to be female and unmarried, less well educated, and less affluent. Respondents to the NLTCS had many more ADLs than did respondents to the Longitudinal Study on Aging, which surveyed persons over age 70 without regard to functional status. (See ta ble 1.)
A strength of the NLTCS is that it obtained information on income by source and on wealth of various types as well as data on demographic variables, health, and functional status. However, respondents appeared to have more difficulty answering questions on income and wealth than on most other topics, or they were sometimes reluctant to provide per sonal financial information. When information on nonhousing wealth and income were missing in NLTCS, we used Tobit regression to develop imputations for the missing values. Predictors included were housing wealth; number of automobiles owned by the household; educational V .hayne 
Policy Simulations
We used data from the NLTCS community sample to conduct policy simulations of spenddown. First, we determined whether a person would be eligible for Medicaid nursing-home coverage in a particular month. We then computed the net price each person would pay. A person who was not on Medicaid was assumed to be paying the nursing home's charge.
Financial eligibility for Medicaid was determined in each month fol lowing hypothetical entry into the nursing home by comparing a per son's wealth and income with the state's eligibility criteria in 1987, and, alternatively, in 1991. We computed annual net prices of nursing-home care faced by the recipient's household during the first three years fol lowing entry to the nursing-home, assuming the person would stay this long. The net price was defined as the price charged by the nursing home minus the following: the discount obtained by Medicaid; the Med icaid subsidy on behalf of the recipient; any cash payment the individual received by virtue of living in the nursing home, plus any public transfer payments the individual lost by entering the nursing home.
Medicaid makes an important distinction between nonhousing and housing wealth in determining eligibility. Therefore, we assessed these two types of wealth separately. Before MCCA, assets were attributed to individual spouses. After MCCA, Medicaid considers all wealth to be jointly held. Thus, for our simulation of eligibility before MCCA, we needed information about asset ownership on a person-specific basis. The NLTCS did not obtain information on ownership of assets by particular household members, but it did obtain information on property income that each household member received. We apportioned nonhousing wealth (which, in our analysis, included all financial assets, rental prop erty, and owned businesses, but excluded automobiles and household goods) based on the property income each spouse received.
When the spouse or a dependent relative lives in the home of the per son in the nursing home, Medicaid treats the home as a protected asset. Most states allowed unmarried, institutionalized recipients to keep their ..)ayne 5 8 x homes indefinitely. In the minority of states that did not, we assumed that an unoccupied home would, in fact, be sold in the month when, ac cording to the state's Medicaid law, it would no longer be excluded as a countable resource. (The extent to which such provisions have been en forced is unknown.) Until the expenditure of the proceeds from the house on private nursing-home charges reduced the person's wealth to the state's resource threshold, we considered the person to be off Med icaid.
Although, at least before MCCA, there was comparatively little varia tion among states in the maximum nonhousing wealth permitted for a person to qualify for Medicaid, there has always been considerable varia tion in the income standards. The variation depends on which of three income eligibility rules the state adopts:
1. The income limit for nursing-home residents is set at the federally allowed maximum of 300 percent of the Supplemental Security In come (SSI) standard for persons living alone in the community (for nursing-home residents, this was $1,020 per month in 1987 and $1,221 in 1991), hereafter termed "high-income threshold." 2. The income limit is set at an amount lower than this, or a "low in come threshold." 3. There is no fixed upper limit on income, but eligibility instead is determined by subtracting medical expense (including nursinghome expense) from income, and the subsidy is provided to per sons whose income, net of such expense, is below a threshold, called the "variable income threshold." In all states, a nominal amount of income ("disregard") is subtracted from income that is considered in eligibility determination.
In states with a fixed income standard, we used this standard to deter mine a person's eligibility. In the other states, we determined a person's eligibility by subtracting the mean price the state Medicaid program paid nursing homes (intermediate-care facility rate) from the individ ual's income. If he or she entered a nursing home, the person would be eligible for Medicaid in a given month if the difference was less than a net income standard. Coverage plausibly extended to the greatest pro portion of disabled elderly in states using the variable income threshold (i.e., states in which Medicaid eligibility for coverage of nursing homes applies to "medically needy" elderly), whereas it extended to the lowest proportion in states with a low income threshold (i.e., those adopting the Section 209[b] option of the Social Security Amendments of 1972, which permitted states to retain tighter eligibility screens). For states em ploying more than one standard, we used the one that extended cover age to the greater number of individuals.
Some persons would have been ineligible during a given month either because they had too much nonhousing wealth or because the state Med icaid program would no longer have been willing to exclude the house from eligibility determination. For these persons, we had to make an as sumption about how the month's care would have been financed be cause information on how private patients finance their stays was unavailable from any source. The individual plausibly would use some combination of income and wealth. We assumed that individuals would use their income up to $100 per month if unmarried and up to $200 if married. We assumed that they would take the rest from nonhousing wealth if the house were a protected asset during that month; otherwise they would take from total wealth. Our results were not sensitive to al ternative plausible spending rules.
As nonhousing wealth is depleted, income from nonhousing wealth declines as well. By contrast, income from Social Security and pensions should be unaffected. Such income therefore was assumed to be un affected by entry into the nursing home. In our simulations, we assumed that reductions in income from nonhousing wealth at entry to the nurs ing home would occur in the same proportion as reductions in the cor pus as the stay progressed. If the person received cash assistance in the community, usually SSI payments, virtually all of this subsidy would be lost if the person were to enter a nursing home because Medicaid allows recipients residing in nursing homes to keep only a very modest "per sonal needs allowance" of $25 to $40 monthly. A loss of a cash subsidy at entry to the nursing home increases the net price of nursing-home care.
The amount of the subsidy in all states depended on the person's in come relative to a number of variables:
1. the personal needs allowance 2. cash assistance to eligible persons in a nursing home with little or no income, the maximum amount of which was generally less than the personal needs allowance 3. the home maintenance allowance for unmarried persons who owned a home 4. set-asides for maintenance of the outside spouse when the institu tionalized spouse's income was more than enough to cover the per sonal needs allowance 5. the outside spouse's contribution to the inside spouse's nursinghome care
The contributions were required by a few states prior to MCCA. Thus, for example, if an unmarried person had a monthly income of $1,000 and the applicable allowances for personal needs and home maintenance were $40 and $400, respectively, the person would be required to con tribute $560 to his or her own care. A person having no income would pay nothing for the nursing home and might receive a cash assistance payment less than, or equal to, the personal needs allowance. We also took into account the policies before and after MCCA con cerning the treatment of married couples' income and assets and require ments concerning the outside spouse's contribution to the cost of the nursing home. Since MCCA, the protected income amounts for couples have been increased and the minimum level has been tied to a percen tage of the federal poverty income level for couples (National Governors' Association 1991). This change was reflected in the estimated net price of nursing-home care to the institutionalized individual in 1991. MCCA required that assets of the couple be pooled and divided in half. The re sources allocated to the outside spouse were protected up to much higher amounts than previously. Immediately before MCCA was enacted, 36 states did not require an outside spouse to contribute to the cost of the inside spouse's nursing-home care. However, the other states at least nominally required the spouse to devote income above a threshold for this purpose (Neuschler 1987) . In our simulations, we assumed that this contribution was in fact made. MCCA eliminated any required contribu tion from the outside spouse.
We also determined the proportion of disabled elderly who were not receiving Medicaid benefits in the community, but who satisfied finan cial eligibility criteria for such benefits. This proportion was compared with the proportion who would satisfy Medicaid's criteria for financial el igibility if they were in a nursing home.
To assess the difference in Medicaid eligibility for nursing-home care and for services in the community, we calculated community residents' eligibility using data from the NLTCS community sample. As a consis tency check of the simulations, we studied actual patterns of spenddown to Medicaid using data from the NLTCS nursing-home sample. To assess the disabled elderly's housing wealth as a potential source of revenue for the Medicaid program, we relied on the NLTCS community sample be cause the NLTCS did not collect information on housing wealth from nursing-home residents.
Findings

Simulated Spenddown to Medicaid
Our computation of the time to spenddown to Medicaid in a nursing home, using the sample of disabled elderly residing in the community from the NLTCS (table 2), revealed that the majority were either already financially eligible or would have been so immediately, had they been institutionalized. About 19 percent were actually on Medicaid in the community and hence presumably would have qualified financially for Medicaid on entry to the nursing home as well. Almost half (46 percent) of the disabled elderly not on Medicaid in the community would have qualified for Medicaid immediately on entry to the nursing home, ac cording to pre-MCCA eligibility rules. After MCCA, nearly three-fifths (59 percent) of such persons would have qualified for Medicaid immedi ately on entry. Almost everyone would qualify if they survived in the nursing home for 10 years or more. Slightly less than 10 percent of the disabled elderly would not have satisfied Medicaid's income and wealth standards within 10 years of entry by pre-MCCA rules. Following MCCA, this group fell to 7 percent.
These results explain why relatively few persons actually switch to Medicaid during even an extended nursing-home stay (table 3) . Of the patients who, at the interview date, had been in a nursing home for 30 months or more, 61 percent were on Medicaid; 46 percent had been on Medicaid since they were admitted. Even fewer among those in nursing homes for less than 30 months switched to Medicaid. Not many disabled elderly persons switch because, as our simulations show, most such per- Although there is widespread concern about assets transfers, our re sults suggest that only a small percentage of persons at relatively high risk of becoming institutionalized -the disabled elderly-would have an incentive to transfer assets. Those financially eligible within six months of entry have, for practical purposes, too little wealth to warrant hiring an attorney to arrange an asset transfer. After 30 months, a wealth trans fer can no longer be contested. Thus, an individual could transfer assets at the time of admission and apply for Medicaid 30 months later without the transfer being questioned by Medicaid. Before MCCA less than a tenth (9.6 percent) of the sample would have potentially spent down to Medicaid after six months and before 30 months in a nursing home. Only about 6 percent would have spent down within this time period af ter MCCA (table 2) .
The provision of MCCA aimed at reducing spousal impoverishment had a dramatic effect on the proportion of married elderly immediately eligible for Medicaid. Although Congress sought to make it more diffi cult to transfer assets for the purpose of establishing eligibility for Medic aid in a nursing home, in fact, it virtually eliminated any incentive for the vast majority of married disabled elderly to transfer assets i f they be lieved their spouses would survive them and remain in the community. Before MCCA, 13 percent of couples -those spending down after six months but before 30 months-might have benefited from an asset transfer, assuming a 30-month lookback period. States' actual lookback periods before MCCA were less than this, implying that even fewer mar ried couples would have benefited. After MCCA, the pool of married persons potentially benefiting from assets transfer shrank to 3 percent.
A question remains whether the results on time to spenddown ob served for disabled elderly nationally generalize to states with different financial eligibility criteria for Medicaid. One might expect that the pro portion of institutionalized disabled elderly who are financially eligible for Medicaid would be higher in states that use a variable income eligi bility standard, which makes Medicaid accessible to persons with higher incomes. This was not the case before MCCA (table 4) , nor is there a rea son to expect a change after MCCA was implemented. (Pre-MCCA esti mates are presented because these rules applied when the 1989 NLTCS was conducted.) Judging from NLTCS data, the disabled elderly in states with a vari able standard had slightly more wealth on average. This greater wealth and the higher nursing-home charges, not the existence of a medically needy program, are factors that explain the somewhat higher proportion of disabled elderly persons likely to spend down to Medicaid in such states.
Compared with nursing-home residents, few disabled elderly in the community qualify for Medicaid. Only 23 percent of the disabled elderly living in the community were either Medicaid recipients or would have passed the wealth and income screens for Medicaid as community resi dents had they applied for Medicaid (table 5) . Unmarried individuals were almost three times more likely than married persons to be Medicaid eligible. Medicaid's more stringent eligibility policies for coverage in the community, compared with coverage in a nursing home, create an im portant bias toward institutionalization.
Simulated Prices of Nursing-home Care Paid by Disabled Elderly Persons
Unlike other forms of care, Medicaid requires recipients to make a siz able contribution to the cost of their own nursing-home care. Based on our simulations, we found that, before MCCA, the disabled elderly liv ing in the community would have paid $10,980 (1991 dollars) out of pocket for nursing-home care on average in the first year following entry into a nursing home, an amount equivalent to 48 percent of the usual nursing-home charge ( fig. 1 ). This mean amount reflects out-of-pocket prices paid by elderly persons both on and not on Medicaid. Such elderly would have paid $10,217 in the second and $9,544 in the third year on average. Virtually all disabled elderly persons in the community eligible for Medicaid in the nursing home (98.1 percent) would have paid some thing to the nursing home for their care. Only part of the price reduc tion to Medicaid recipients reflects a direct subsidy by Medicaid. The rest results from the substantial discount Medicaid obtains from nursing homes in most states. The net prices are charges less discounts Medicaid obtained and subsidies provided by Medicaid. At the margin, a dollar increase in income above the very modest personal needs allowance is taxed at a 100 percent rate up to the discounted nursing-home price that Medicaid pays. There are several reasons for the decline in net price over time in a nursing home. Most important, as duration of stay increases, a higher proportion of elderly become Medicaid eligible. Also, however, as some elderly on Medicaid spend their assets, income decreases correspond ingly. As a recipient's income falls, the amount of income "taxed" by Medicaid declines.
On the other hand, there are reasons for net price, as we computed it, to rise for a while as the stay lengthens. The home maintenance allow ance protected recipients' incomes for only a limited period. Also, Med icaid in some states required institutionalized individuals who were not expected to return home to sell their houses to pay for the cost of the nursing home. Income from the sale of the house would make them temporarily ineligible, during which time they would have to pay the higher private rate and assume the entire cost.
Our simulations suggest that MCCA's spousal impoverishment provi sion reduced the net price of nursing-home care. The net price of care paid by married persons fell by one-third on average. Whereas before MCCA Medicaid's subsidy was greater for unmarried than for married el derly, the reverse was true after MCCA. Net prices tended to be higher in states with variable income thresholds for Medicaid eligibility (not shown). The subsidies in such states were roughly comparable to other states; the difference in net price was due primarily to the higher wealth of disabled elderly persons and higher nursing-home charges in such states.
The pattern of net prices by year changed for unmarried persons as well. Before MCCA, net prices declined monotonically. After MCCA, net price increased in the second year. This occurred not because of MCCA, but rather because several states switched their eligibility standard from a low-income threshold to other thresholds. As a result, some unmarried persons became Medicaid eligible earlier in the nursing-home stay and policies regarding retention of the house and home maintenance allow ance took effect earlier.
The Disabled Elderly' s Housing Wealth
One-third of disabled elderly community residents had no housing wealth in 1989, based on data from the 1989 NLTCS (table 6) . The other two-thirds, however, had housing assets that, if tapped, might be sufficient to offset an appreciable share of Medicaid's outlays for nurs ing-home care if, in fact, they should receive such care and be covered by Medicaid. The community disabled elderly averaged $45,062 (in 1991 dollars) in housing wealth in 1989. However, considering only persons with some housing wealth, the mean of $45,062 increases to $67,865, which would cover about three years of nursing-home care at the prices Medicaid programs pay. Mean values for the disabled elderly population are comparable to those for persons over age 75 regardless of functional impairments, according to data obtained from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (Radbill and Short 1992) . If Medicaid took wealth from nursing-home recipients, it would pre sumably take such wealth from unmarried persons who constitute the vast majority of nursing-home residents. It is doubtful that Medicaid would change current rules excluding the home from countable re sources as long as the spouse lives there. Although the fraction of dis abled elderly persons with houses varies by marital status, the mean value of housing wealth for those with a house varies litde.
The estimates in table 6 pertain to housing wealth of disabled persons in the community at the time of the survey. Another admission to a nursing home would plausibly cause some reduction in wealth, but it would less likely be housing than nonhousing wealth. The mean values in table 6 are elevated by the inclusion of persons who would not be eli gible for Medicaid within 10 years or more after admission to a nursing home. However, as noted previously, these persons represent a very small share of the disabled elderly population.
Although housing assets held by the elderly appear to be sufficiently high to offset an appreciable portion of Medicaid expenditures for nurs ing-home care, a survey of Medicaid programs that we conducted from late 1991 to early 1992 revealed that few state programs have recovered funds commensurate with the potential amounts that could have been tapped. Twenty-six states had estate recovery programs, of which only four (California, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin) reported annual recoveries of over six million dollars. Only nine states placed liens on the property of institutionalized Medicaid recipients; for those with data, the amounts of potential recoveries were very modest: about 0.5 million dollars per state per year.
Public Policy Implications
Impoverishment and Spenddown
There is widespread concern that the elderly become impoverished by expenditures on nursing-home care and that they must deplete their as sets in order to qualify for Medicaid coverage. Our analysis suggests oth erwise. Relatively few disabled elderly have assets sufficient to make them ineligible for Medicaid coverage of nursing-home care. If any thing, we have overstated the incentive of the disabled elderly to transfer assets because the simulations do not consider the possibility of death or leaving the nursing home before spenddown could occur. In fact, mor tality rates of the disabled elderly are high. By the time of the 1984 in terviews, 22 percent of respondents to the 1982 NLTCS had died (Headen 1993) .
For purposes of considering the lack of asset spenddown, it is useful to divide the life cycle of persons over age 65 into three stages:
1. before the onset of functional impairments 2. after the onset of such impairments 3. after entry into a long-term-care facility Of course, many elderly never become functionally impaired for an ap preciable length of time, and most never enter a long-term-care facility. However, persons who enter the first stage face appreciable risk of enter ing the second and third.
In our study, we measured the elderly's income and wealth in only the second and third stages. By the time many elderly persons reach the sec ond stage, they have little or no wealth other than a house, and there fore nonhousing wealth is no longer a barrier to receipt of Medicaid. Their income, which is largely derived from Social Security and private pensions, does not bar them from Medicaid if they enter a nursing home, but is much more frequently a barrier for receipt of Medicaid while they live in the community. This is the major factor accounting for the lack of spenddown in the nursing home that we and others (Burwell, Adams, and Meiners 1989; Spence and Wiener 1990; Liu, Doty, and Manton 1990) have observed. Lack of spenddown does not primarily re sult from some patients staying in the nursing home for short periods and/or elderly persons' reliance on relatives for contributions to the cost of their nursing-home care-possibilities suggested by others (Spence and Wiener 1990; Liu, Doty, and Manton 1990) .
The fact that these individuals were no more affluent on average in 1984 than in 1989 suggests that becoming poor from transferring assets in anticipation of being institutionalized was not widespread. Only in frequently would transfers for this purpose be likely to occur five or more years in advance of an anticipated nursing-home stay. Further, compar ing nonhousing wealth of the NLTCS respondents in 1984 and 1989 (not shown), we found that about as many disabled elderly individuals accumulated such wealth as lost it during the five years between the sur veys. This suggests that the lack of nonhousing wealth of the disabled el derly has its roots in stage one-that is, an appreciable share of persons who become elderly with functional impairments never accumulate much wealth beyond a house.
Admittedly, we know far less about the wealth of people in the first stage and changes in wealth associated with the transition from the fust stage to the second. Impoverishment of the disabled elderly begins be fore a nursing-home stay, and therefore focus on impoverishment as a consequence of nursing-home use is misplaced. To the extent that im poverishment of the disabled elderly is a policy issue, emphasis should be placed on the elderly more generally.
The Elderly' s "Fair" Share o f the Cost o f Long-term Care
Although the issue of impoverishment of the elderly is at one end of the policy spectrum, at the other end is the argument that the elderly and their families should pay an even larger part of long-term-care expense. Our simulations suggest that relatively few disabled elderly have sufficient nonhousing wealth to make finding legal loopholes to shield wealth worth the cost to these individuals. Since implementation of MCCA's spousal impoverishment provisions, lack of an incentive to shield assets is partic ularly applicable to married individuals as long as they stay married. Thus, further tightening of Medicaid transfer-of-assets rules would not raise appreciable amounts of revenue for long-term care.
Traditionally, Medicaid has given preferential treatment to housing wealth in determining financial eligibility and, to a lesser extent, in as sessing recipients for part of their nursing-home expense. Most wealth of the disabled elderly living in the community is in the home, according to data from the 1989 NLTCS (not shown). Unfortunately, we could not compute a similar percentage for nursing-home residents because the NLTCS did not obtain information on housing wealth from such per sons. Thus, we cannot know for sure whether nursing-home residents are voluntarily liquidating their home equity to pay for their care. For many reasons, among them that Medicaid does not require depletion of hous ing assets as a condition of eligibility, at least at entry to a nursing home, many elderly may choose not to reduce such assets.
Requiring that housing assets be used to finance a nursing-home stay while a spouse or dependent relative lives in the home or when there is more than a negligible chance that the institutionalized individual will return home would violate social norms. A stronger case can be made for using such wealth when the home or its proceeds would otherwise be come the property of nondependent relatives or friends. Proceeds from sale of the home after the surviving spouse or dependent has died could be used to finance an appreciable amount of nursing-home care that would otherwise be subsidized by Medicaid.
There are two arguments against requiring sale of a home. First, infor mal caregiving may be partly motivated by expectations of inheritance (Bernheim, Schleifer, and Summers 1985) . Thus, aggressive pursuit of housing wealth may reduce informal caregiving, which is a much more important source of support of the disabled elderly in the community than is formal care. According to data from the 1989 NLTCS, the dis abled elderly in the community received 17 hours of informal care from relatives and friends and four hours of formal, paid care per week, on av erage. Second, requiring a person to give up a home to finance a cata strophic acute illness such as cancer or AIDS would clearly violate social norms. There would be an inconsistency in requiring persons with dis eases that frequently lead to long-term disability and are equally beyond the individual's control, such as stroke and Alzheimer's disease, to pay for the cost of their care with their homes. These concerns may explain, at least in part, states' inactivity to date in pursuing liens and estate re coveries in order to provide revenue for their Medicaid programs.
Options for Funding Long-term Care
A larger question concerns the appropriateness of current reliance on Medicaid, a program ostensibly designed to finance acute care for lowincome persons, as the primary source of third-party funding for long term care for a much larger segment of the population. With Medicaid's income and assets standards set where they are, a high percentage of dis abled elderly persons, as our simulations indicate, would be financially eligible for Medicaid at entry to a nursing home. The spousal impover ishment provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 pushed the nation further in the direction of universal long-term-care fi nancing, perhaps inadvertently.
The availability of Medicaid payment for nursing-home care for most disabled elderly helps to explain why a market for private long-term-care insurance has been slow to evolve (Pauly 1990 ; U.S. General Accounting Office 1987). Even so, many disabled elderly individuals may not regard Medicaid and private long-term-care insurance as perfect substitutes for each other. Much of the price reduction reported above is attributable to discounts Medicaid obtains rather than to the public subsidy per se. As a result, many nursing homes give subsequently lower priority to Medic aid recipients or persons likely to become Medicaid eligible (U.S. Gen eral Accounting Office 1990). This policy on the part of nursing homes is reflected in our finding that fewer disabled elderly in nursing homes actually receive Medicaid benefits than our calculations revealed to be el igible for such assistance. Also, persons covered by Medicaid may not gain access to homes of a quality comparable to facilities for private-pay patients.
As an alternative to the current Medicaid system of financing long term care or to a private market, the nation could decide to implement more complete protection against the catastrophic costs of long-term care by adopting compulsory social insurance for long-term care. A social in surance system presumably would not require the substantial out-of-pocket payments that our calculations show Medicaid now imposes and would probably improve disabled elderly persons' access to nursing-home care. However, competition for health-care dollars to pay for hospital, physi cian, and other health services is a major impediment to social insurance for long-term care.
